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Testimony of Gerald J. Bender to the
Senate Subcommittee on Africa of the
Foreign Relations Committee.

Hearing on Southern Africa: Angola

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THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
A RESPONSIBLE AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD ANGOLA

In addition to our discussions today of the current situation in Angola, I would like to direct my remarks to the question of what role, if any, the United States should play with regard to Angola, and concretely, how the Congress can assist in the formulation and execution of a responsible American policy toward Angola. We have all learned a number of important lessons from recent revelations about the conduct of American policy in Southeast Asia, about Government coverups such as Watergate, corporate bribery of foreign officials and political parties, and about the illegal and unacceptable activities of the CIA as described in the Rockefeller Commission report and elsewhere. Certainly we can apply some of these lessons to our present consideration of U.S. policy toward Angola; hopefully we will learn the vital facts and ask the necessary questions now, rather than, as has too often been the case, after the fact.

A lengthy appendix of my views on the current situation in Angola (through May 1975) is attached. It provides the background for my conviction that the U.S. should not contemplate--let alone provide--overt or covert assistance to any Angolan political party, faction or pressure group. It is no secret that

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Angola is sitting on a powder keg which has been threatening to erupt for months; the Portuguese authorities in Luanda and Lisbon and all major nationalist leaders acknowledge this fact. The causes are also clear: Angola is afflicted with deep racial, ethnic, regional, class and ideological cleavages; intense distrust and personal animosity among the nationalist leaders; and the active interest (and occasional involvement) of major and minor foreign powers. For most, the only mystery is exactly when and where the eruption will occur. Our concern should be to guarantee that the U.S. is not directly or indirectly involved in any Angolan conflicts if or when they take place.

The 1970 National Security Council study of American policy in southern Africa (NSSM 39) noted that the U.S. had no strategic interests in Angola which were vital to our security. Subsequent events--especially the recent opening of the Suez Canal--have made Angola even less important to American strategic interests. Moreover, the total value of fixed U.S. investment there is very small--under \$70 million (an overwhelming majority of it by one company, Gulf Oil). Therefore, regardless of the outcome of the present struggle for power in Angola, the U.S. in reality has very little to win or lose by remaining resolutely neutral unless we mistakenly assume that what is good for Gulf Oil is good for the United States.

This should not suggest, however, that all of the feuding factions in Angola look equally favorably upon American foreign policy objectives or the presence of U.S. corporations in the country. In fact, we have a host of journalists, scholars and ideo-

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logical soothsayers who have provided us with convenient, if grossly misleading, shortcuts to an understanding of the ideological configurations of the nationalist parties. The MPLA is usually labeled Marxist or pro-Communist, the UNITA is alleged to follow the Maoist line, while the FNLA is said to be strongly pro-West. Yet, for every piece of evidence which supports these labels there is a fact which contradicts it. For example, although UNITA is alleged to be the Maoist party, it not only receives very little support from China but there is no trace of "Chinese economics" in the party's endorsement of a vigorous private sector or its rejection of any attempt to reorganize the rural peasantry. In fact, the bulk of China's support (including weapons, numerous military instructors, and financial aid) has been directed to the "pro-Western" FNLA whose economic policies are even less Maoist than UNITA's!

Similar contradictions obtain with respect to each party's position toward whites. Before the April 1974 coup in Lisbon, conventional wisdom held that the MPLA was strongly multiracial while both the FNLA and UNITA were almost exclusively oriented toward Africans. Today the MPLA is increasingly accused of being "anti-white," UNITA is often portrayed as the rallying point of most white settlers, and even the FNLA is said to have considerable financial support from whites as well as a number of Portuguese serving as its uniformed soldiers.

There is considerable evidence supporting both the old and new views of the economic and racial (and other) policies of the three nationalist parties; we should therefore be extremely

cautious in accepting simplistic analyses which predict how any of the parties would proceed once in power. Whereas each party has proved to be inflexible on many issues, all have manifested a degree of pragmatism in adapting to Angola's economic, regional, racial and ethnic exigencies. This should not be surprising to those who have followed the policies of the Viet Cong--especially their initial reluctance to abolish the private sector or undertake massive retribution against their former foes in South Vietnam after their recent victory. How many "experts" foresaw this and how many warnings did we receive to the contrary?

The point I wish to emphasize is that it is simply not possible for anyone to predict with certainty which Angolan party would best serve the interests of Angola, or the United States. Naturally, our views are conditioned by our own perceptions of Angola's or America's interests and whether we are looking at the long or short range. However, even within these parameters, the present fluidity of Angolan politics is such that any prediction, and especially one based on the recommendations of professional diviners, is hazardous at this time. I believe that this reality may account for why we see so little urging, in or out of government, that the U.S. overtly support one of the contending parties.

Covert support, however, is another matter and this is precisely where Congress must exercise its responsibility to monitor and sanction the covert activities of American intelligence agencies--a responsibility which has been abdicated too often in the past. One cannot overemphasize the potential dangers which

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Angola presents for the U.S., the most important being the peril of becoming embroiled in yet another civil war through the covert activities of government agencies or private corporations. Therefore, those in Congress who agree that it is both imprudent and dangerous for the U.S. to support any of the factions in Angola have a special obligation to ensure that neither the CIA, DIA nor any other intelligence agency or private corporation is currently providing covert assistance to any of the Angolan parties. Let us find out now where we might be "committed" or compromised in Angola so that there will not be a necessity later to carry out yet another painful autopsy, to produce even more "Pentagon Papers" to discover how and why we became involved! If the United States is in the process of becoming committed or actually is committed in the Angolan struggle, let us not only find out now but publicly debate the policy to see if it has general support.

Concretely, many respectable people are convinced that the United States is aiding the FNLA, and possibly FLEC, presumably through our connections in Zaire. In recent months this charge has appeared in the world press almost daily. Because the accusation is so ubiquitously accepted, we are associated with this policy; therefore this Committee, the Senate (Church) or House (Stanton) Committees on intelligence activities or some other Congressional committee should investigate the charge to determine its validity. I can only speculate about it from my personal ("soft") information and knowledge that U.S. intelligence agencies have intervened in a number of countries in the developing world,

such as Iran, Guatemala, Cuba, and in ways ranging from the fielding of an entire army of (Meo) mercenaries in Laos to the expenditure of over \$8 million to "destabilize" the Allende regime in Chile. The Congress, however, is in a position to do more than speculate on U.S. covert activities related to Angola. For example, it should be possible these days to inquire if the CIA, DIA or any of the other dozen or so federal agencies which have intelligence gathering functions are involved in assisting any of the legitimate or illegitimate Angolan parties, and if so, determine who authorized such support and under what policy. For the Congress to fail to exercise this power and responsibility now would constitute a gross act of negligence!

The dangers of American covert intervention are not confined to our various intelligence agencies. U.S. and multinational corporations have shown themselves to be equally disposed to providing covert funds for foreign leaders, parties and pressure groups. Significantly, the corporation which is among the most notorious in this respect is Gulf Oil--the same company which accounts for nearly three quarters of total U.S. investment in Angola. Because of the prominence of Gulf's operations in Angola and its proven tendency to provide covert corporate funds for political bribery, it is vital that there be a thorough investigation of Gulf's activities in Angola. This is especially important because Gulf is almost certain to be a focal point of conflict in Angola's future, no matter who comes to power and even if the company is not providing covert assistance. In fact, it is so probable that Gulf will present problems for the U.S. Government

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in the future (should they be nationalized any day or they may be nationalized) that the Government should determine now whether the company is committed to any of the partisans in the present power struggle. In a hypothetical example, if it were discovered that Gulf had been helping to finance the advocates of Cabindan secession (FLEC) and the secession attempt failed, what would be the responsibilities of the U.S. Government to protect the company against possible retributions by one or all of the Angolan nationalist parties?

I put this example hypothetically, but it is commonly believed that Gulf is doing precisely this as well as possibly providing assistance to the FNLA. What is not hypothetical is that over the past six to eight months Gulf has been threatened publicly or privately by FLEC, FNLA and the MPLA and these threats have included blackmail--i.e., if the company does not provide money their installations will be destroyed. Exactly one month ago today Gulf President, Bob Dorsey, sat here before another Senate Committee and explained that the company's covert payoffs in Korea, Bolivia and Italy resulted from situations where "we were subject to pressures which were simply not possible to resist." The "pressures" in these three countries do not appear to exceed those the company faces in Angola where the magnitude of Gulf's investment is not appreciably smaller than that in Korea--where four million dollars were paid under the table. The Senate should investigate to see if there are any parallels between Gulf's financial machinations in Angola and those in Korea, Bolivia and Italy.

Gulf should not be singled out, however. Other large American corporations, such as Texaco and General Tire, have millions of dollars invested in Angola and operate in politically sensitive areas there. The Mayaguez incident illustrates how a private corporation can involve the United States in a military conflict when it sails into troubled waters. The oil-rich waters off Angola's coast are clearly troubled.

A Congressional investigation into the covert activities of American corporations in Angola would clarify whether these companies are undertaking any political activities which may be contrary to U.S. interests; it could also serve as a forum for Congress to investigate the general question of how to deal in the future with pressures on American companies abroad. If it is true that "the hard fact is that even the most powerful multinational corporation is almost helpless when it comes to even the smallest banana republic or dictatorship" demanding undercover payoffs, as former Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Charles E. Walker recently argued in the New York Times (8 June 1975), then such an investigation should be welcomed by the corporations. Clearly there is a need for the Congress to examine fully this difficult problem and hopefully draft legislation which can help the corporations manage future pressures which are "simply not possible to resist."

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to Angola. A situation could develop before or after Angolan independence making it necessary for some outside power to help restore the peace. At present, Portugal is almost overtaxed in its capacity to do appreciably more than its excellent performance during the past difficult months. It is likely that there will be suggestions or demands that the U.S. make a contribution to any peace-keeping efforts. I strongly suggest that if we offer humanitarian assistance we do not undertake it bilaterally. The UN, OAU or Portugal itself offer the best channels for directing our support. Portugal presently has very close ties with Zambia and Tanzania, among other African countries, and is in contact with Zaire. In addition to the Portuguese general knowledge of Angola, this suggests that it would be wise to work very closely with Portugal with respect to any potential American assistance. In fact, the U.S. Government may wish to explore with the Portuguese Government the means by which we could assist with the costs or logistical problems attendant to any expanded peace-keeping efforts. This would help Portugal and Angola at the same time, while maintaining a low profile. It would not be unlike the recent British offer to assist Mozambique with the added financial burdens which will occur from the imposition of UN sanctions against Rhodesia.

Senators, the United States is presently undergoing an agonizing but healthy reassessment of our foreign policy throughout most of the world, from Russia and China to Southeast Asia, the Middle East and even Cuba. We are realizing that many of our past policies and approaches are not well suited to the world we

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find in 1975. Africa, however, appears once again to be forgotten in this reassessment. Yet nowhere in the world is a major reassessment more in order than with respect to Angola and Mozambique. Our policy in the past toward these former Portuguese colonies is a source of little pride for Americans. Thus, it appears worthwhile to briefly review that policy up to now in order to appreciate better the full context in which these hearings are taking place.

From the late 1960s until the Portuguese coup, U.S. policy toward Angola and Mozambique was based on two mutually exclusive goals: (1) to express sympathy with the aspirations of Angolans and Mozambicans for self-determination, and (2) to help support Portugal, a NATO ally. In pursuit of the former goal the U.S. adopted a policy of "communication" and "dialogue" under the assumption that the most efficacious means for realizing self-determination was communication, not violence. The assumption was naive (at best) and hypocritical because no one honestly believed that Salazar or Caetano could be convinced through "communication" of the need for self-determination in the colonies. In fact, no example in the public or private record indicates that the U.S. ever successfully moved the Portuguese an inch closer to granting independence to Angola, Mozambique, or Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, the policy of communication was not extended to the nationalist movements, who were generally ignored so as not to

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offend the Portuguese. This fear of offending Portugal actually prompted American consulates in the two colonies to maintain minimal communication with the African populations.

Pursuit of the second goal, to assist our NATO ally, was less hypocritical. The U.S. trained Portuguese officers here and supplied Portugal with airplanes, equipment which could serve either military or civilian purposes, large Ex-Im credits and loans, napalm, herbicides, and, most importantly, moral support. There was always a sophistic explanation of how each example of U.S. aid to Portugal could be interpreted in "two ways," but the sum total of American actions left no doubt about which side the U.S. actually supported in the struggles for independence in the Portuguese African colonies. If there were any doubts remaining by 1974, they were removed when the National Security Council Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM 39) came into the public domain. This study of American policy in southern African submitted to President Nixon by Henry Kissinger in early 1970 details a number of options for the United States in that area. Regardless of whether or not the infamous option 2 was ever officially recommended or adopted, it clearly approximated the scenario for U.S. policy in the 1970s. The U.S. placed its bets on the tenacity of the Caetano regime and the white settlers to hold the line in Angola and Mozambique--and lost.

Following the Portuguese coup, the United States had the opportunity to launch a fresh policy toward the Portuguese African colonies. A month before the Armed Forces Movement toppled

~~the Caetano regime, Easum was replaced by Kissinger's Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.~~ Approved For Release 2002/06/05 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300030007-2 Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Easum sought to shift the focus of American policy toward "using our influence to foster change" rather than continuing to "preserve the status-quo." Despite the long American record of opposition to the nationalists in the Portuguese colonies and the ambivalence toward normalizing relations with the liberation movements in the months after the coup, Mr. Easum engineered a diplomatic breakthrough with FRELIMO in early November 1974. Following a frank and important meeting with FRELIMO President Samora Machel in Dar es Salaam, Mr. Easum travelled to Mozambique and was the first foreign diplomat to hold a formal meeting with the transitional government. However, less than forty-eight hours after his return to the United States, Mr. Easum was informed that he would be replaced (after only nine months in office).

Secretary Kissinger selected Nathaniel Davis, who had no diplomatic experience in Africa and who served as Ambassador in Chile during the Allende overthrow, to replace Mr. Easum. Predictably, concern was immediately expressed that the U.S. might implement the politics of "destabilization" in Africa. Moreover, Mr. Davis' nomination was strongly and unanimously condemned by the Organization of African Unity. There have been many explanations for this sudden and unorthodox change, including Secretary Kissinger's statement to columnist Carl Rowan that the change emanated solely from the fact that the Secretary realized he "had no African policy" and therefore decided to shake up the African bureau from top to bottom. Many, including FRELIMO,

believed that under Mr. Fesum the U.S. had finally developed an "African policy" which was more sympathetic to the goals and aspirations of Africans. Now that Mr. Davis has been confirmed as Assistant Secretary of State, presumably the United States will change the direction of its present (non?) policy. Mr. Davis will appear before this committee the day after tomorrow and I hope you will have the opportunity to discuss any new directions in American policy, especially with respect to Angola and Mozambique.

APPENDIX:

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN ANGOLA*

What this country lacks is a national consciousness. The people should be Angolans first and then militants of this or that party. Precisely the opposite is occurring....The problem must be faced squarely: if the movements give their full support to the Government, it will be able to govern. If there are reservations, the Government ceases to be the Government because it must be able to execute the decisions it takes.

--Diógenes Boavida, Minister of Justice in the Angolan Transitional Government. Quoted in *Expresso* (Lisbon), 3 May 1975.

For 15 years we have built up a great hatred of each other...and now, all of a sudden, we have to work together. Violence is almost inevitable if you have come straight from the maquis to the Palace without a preparatory period.

--Johnny Eduardo, Member of the Presidential Council. Quoted in *The Sunday Times* (London), 18 May 1975.

Since the very beginning of the nationalist struggle in Angola in 1961, fear has been expressed about the prospects of chaos and bloodshed after independence. Blacks and whites, radicals and reactionaries have all pointed to racial, ethnic, class, regional, and ideological cleavages as evidence for the possibility of disunity

*This assessment of the current situation in Angola is an updated (through May 1975) version of part of a paper I delivered at the Seven Springs Center Symposium on Change in Contemporary Southern Africa, 9-11 May 1975. The original paper is entitled, "Portugal, Angola and Mozambique: One Year Later."

and violence once Angolans achieved ultimate control over their own land and destinies. During the thirteen years of armed warfare, it was as difficult to find an optimist about Angola's future as it was to find an African in the upper echelons of the Angolan colonial service. The tragedy of Angola as she approaches independence (scheduled for 11 November 1975) is that these cleavages became more pronounced during the long struggle and today more than ever the country seems destined to fulfill even the most lugubrious prognostications.

An economic drain on Portugal for centuries, Angola finally blossomed in the late 1960s and was booming at the time of the coup. Her mineral wealth of oil, diamonds and iron ore, and the fourth largest coffee production in the world helped to push her GNP to nearly \$2 billion. In 1974 exports increased more than a third over those of 1973 despite the uncertainty which prevailed throughout most of the year following the April coup. The economic stakes have been extremely high, especially for the Portuguese and foreign investors and the approximately 325,000 Portuguese living in the colony.* Furthermore, the whites' economic control and political power had never been so extensive or dominating as it was in April 1974 and they were determined not to relinquish one iota of their dominance.

During General Spínola's five months in office, there were few genuine or meaningful steps taken in Angola toward decolonization. Angola's first Provisional Government was headed by an indecisive and conservative General, Silvino Silvério Marques, and was almost totally white. It showed little resolve to stop whites in Luanda (led by the taxi drivers) from attacking the slums and killing hundreds of Africans throughout the summer of 1974. Africans finally took the law into their own hands and retaliated by attacking white and Cape Verdian shopowners in the slums and burning their stores

*Given the recent exodus, there were approximately 250,000 whites remaining in Angola as of early June, 1975.

to the ground. Luanda proved to be the racial keg of dynamite so many had feared it would be and its fuse is still uncomfortably short.

The racial violence undoubtedly would have continued and grown had it not been for the arrival of the nationalist parties on the political scene in the early fall, thereby shifting the focus of violence from an interracial to an interparty basis. Angola's three principal nationalist groups (FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA) had been reluctant to stop the war and openly enter the country until Lisbon's intentions concerning the future were clarified. The replacement of High Commissioner Silvério Marques with Admiral Rosa Coutinho (a key member of the Armed Forces Movement [AFM] and a strong critic of Spínola) in late July and Spínola's removal from office a month later made it quite clear that the AFM intended to grant unconditional independence. One by one each of the nationalist parties set up its headquarters in Luanda with branches in other major cities. Then the Algarve agreement, signed in Portugal on 15 January 1975 by the three parties and the Portuguese government, limited the number of legitimate political parties to the FNLA, MPLA, and UNITA. The internecine conflicts which had dominated relations among Angolan nationalists for the past two decades were resumed. In previous years their attacks on each other had been generally verbal, carried out in foreign languages in the pages of international newspapers and periodicals; occasionally they had fought physically on the battlefield in remote parts of the colony. However, once they were able to campaign openly for support, the insecurities, distrust, fears and hatred which had been nurtured during the long years of underground and exile politics threatened to engulf millions of Angolans of all races.

Any brief summary of the nationalists' history, background, ethnic and regional strengths, economic and political orientations, and international support must overgeneralize and simplify and therefore courts misunderstanding. There is an exception to almost every rule. With this caveat in mind and at the broadest level of

generalization, it can be said that each of the parties is closely identified with one of the three major ethno-linguistic communities, which are regionally based, and each receives competing sources of external support.

The FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) is deeply rooted among Kikongo speaking peoples in northwestern Angola and southwestern Zaire. Before 1974 there were less than half a million Kikongo in Angola; estimates of the number of refugees and émigrés in Zaire range between 500,000 and 1,500,000. The latter estimate emanates from the FNLA and has raised concern in Angola that they are attempting to increase their power base by incorporating Zairien Kikongo into FNLA political and military ranks. Until early 1975 the FNLA had remained an almost exclusively Kikongo movement. The few non-Kikongo cadres it attracted had either resigned (e.g., Jonas Savimbi) or had been imprisoned (e.g., Rosário Neto). FNLA leader Holden Roberto capitalized on the large Angolan population in Zaire, the strong support he has always received from the governments of Zaire (with the exception of Tshombe), and his relationship (through marriage) and close personal friendship with President Mobutu Sésé Séko to firmly ensconce the FNLA within the parameters of Zaire's political system.

The FNLA is widely assumed to have the support of the United States. Mobutu's close association with the U.S. has reinforced this belief, which was further nurtured by the Azores meeting between Spínola and Nixon (which Rosa Coutinho argues resulted in Spínola's hardened anti-communist attitudes), followed by the Cape Verde meeting of Spínola, Mobutu and Roberto in mid-September. Presumably, it was agreed during the latter meeting that the FNLA would play a dominant role in Angola's transitional government--this presumption was an important catalyst in the AFM's removal of the General two weeks later.

Roberto has taken a militantly anti-Soviet stance, condemning the "imperialist designs" and "social fascism" of the Russians, and

has bitterly attacked the socialist policies promulgated by the Armed Forces Movement in Portugal, vowing to resist their imposition on Angola. Yet, in addition to Zairien support, Rumania and China have recently supplied most of the FNLA's arms and munitions and China has sent over one hundred instructors to Zaire (including a Chinese major general) to train the FNLA army.

The FNLA's strong identification with the Kikongo speaking community and the internal and external interests of Zaire mitigate the party's political appeal within Angola. Its strength lies principally in its large and well equipped army, numbering approximately 20,000. Except for the Portuguese army, scheduled to be fully withdrawn by February 1976, the FNLA army has no rival in Angola. Moreover, Roberto has rarely hesitated to flex his military muscles in political controversy.

The incorporation in February 1975 of a dissident faction of the MPLA, led by Daniel Chipenda, will certainly reinforce the FNLA military dominance since Chipenda brought approximately 3,000 troops with him (reputed to have been the best trained and most experienced in the MPLA army). Chipenda, who was appointed Secretary-General of the FNLA, is an Umbundu. His appointment and the inclusion of two Kimbundu in executive positions represent the FNLA's most serious effort since the mid-1960s to expand its ethnic appeal. Whether this will enable the party to significantly augment its support beyond northern Angola remains to be seen, although there have been some signs of incipient Kimbundu support. Certainly, by elevating Chipenda to an important leadership position, the FNLA has inextricably identified itself with an individual whom the MPLA views as the "most dangerous" and "number one traitor" in Angola. Already mortal enemies, the Chipenda affair placed the FNLA and MPLA on a violent collision course which, in February of this year, finally brought them to gun battles in Luanda's slums. While there have since been occasional lulls, the fighting between the two parties has been almost continuous. By the end of May it had spread beyond

the capital to engulf dozens of cities and towns in northern, eastern and central Angola.

Historically, the MPLA (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola) has drawn most of its support from the intellectuals--blacks, mestiços, and at most a couple thousand whites--and the approximately 1.5 million Kimbundu speaking peoples, most of whom are concentrated within a radius of 150 miles of the capital, many actually living in Luanda's slums. Headed by Dr. Agostinho Neto, the MPLA leadership is well educated, urbane, multiracial, and politically radical--qualities which helped the party gain the overwhelming support of most African nations, the USSR, the countries of eastern Europe, progressive Portuguese and most of those in western Europe and the U.S. who supported the liberation of the Portuguese colonies. Ironically, the very qualities of leadership which projected the MPLA into international prominence may not be well suited to contemporary Angolan politics. Since the Portuguese coup Dr. Neto and the party have been increasingly criticized for being out of touch with the people and these accusations appear to have cut into some of the MPLA's traditional support.

A more serious blow to the MPLA was the internal dispute which, after April 1974, left the party with three separate factions, each claiming to be the only true representative. The Chipenda faction ("Eastern Revolt") eventually merged with the FNLA. A second group of dissidents ("Active Revolt"), which accused Neto of being too authoritarian and secretive, appears to have reached an uneasy reconciliation with their former nemesis, although few have actually returned to Angola to rejoin the party. The strong support Neto received from the AFM helped him to keep his grip on the controls of party power. In fact, Roberto, Chipenda, Savimbi, and Mobutu were so outspoken in their criticism of High Commissioner Rosa Coutinho's unmitigated support of Neto that Portugal was forced to replace Coutinho after the Algarve accord. His replacement, General

Silva Cardoso, has attempted to follow a strictly neutral policy toward the three parties, which has resulted in a sharp reversal of MPLA and FNLA attitudes toward the role of the Portuguese High Commissioner. Whereas Holden Roberto and Rosa Coutinho had exchanged charges almost daily, the FNLA President praises Silva Cardoso's conduct as "exemplary." Neto, on the other hand, is deeply resentful of the High Commissioner's reduced support and his frequent charges that the MPLA has been distributing sophisticated weapons to teenagers and other civilians in Luanda.

The MPLA has also criticized the Portuguese army, claiming that it has been passive and vacillating in the maintenance of security (i.e., not preventing FNLA armed attacks). This charge has illicit denials and countercharges from some of Neto's (formerly?) strongest backers in the Portuguese cabinet, including Melo Antunes, Almeida Santos, and Vitor Alves. By early June this situation had deteriorated to the point that Neto, in a message sent to a pro-MPLA rally in Lisbon, declared that the "internal reactionary forces" in Angola were serving imperialism and attacking the people "with bloodthirsty fury." He added that these forces enjoyed the support of Silva Cardoso who, Neto claimed, had abandoned all pretense of neutrality with his open opposition to the MPLA. Recently, MPLA soldiers have been shooting at Portuguese air force planes flying over areas where they and FNLA troops were fighting--a further manifestation of the breakdown in relations between the MPLA and the Portuguese military forces in Angola.

The MPLA's present attitude toward the Armed Forces Movement is almost schizophrenic. On the one hand, the party is convinced that the Portuguese troops in Angola are trying to crush it as part of an imperialist plot to eliminate "the only progressive party in the country;" on the other hand, the MPLA continues to praise the "anti-imperialist" policies of the Revolutionary Council of the AFM. Unquestionably, there are strong personal and ideological bonds between the MPLA and the AFM but these may be eclipsed by an apparently growing belief among the Portuguese

officers that a more neutral approach is necessary to restore the peace. The AFM's recent attempts to normalize relations with Zaire are a manifestation of this apparent change. Moreover, Neto's bitter attacks on the High Commissioner and the Portuguese military in Angola appear to have offended the professional pride of Lisbon's ruling soldiers, including some who are considered to be Marxists. If an open break between the MPLA and the AFM develops, the MPLA's situation could become extremely precarious.

The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) was founded by Jonas Savimbi in 1966, two years after he had bitterly resigned from the FNLA. UNITA's strength is concentrated in Angola's central highlands and southern plateau areas, especially among the Umbundu speaking peoples who constitute a third of Angola's population. The party lost its only external base (Zambia) in 1967 which necessitated the establishment of all operations inside the colony. Without sufficient external support to equip and train a military force comparable to the FNLA's or MPLA's, UNITA expended most of its efforts on political mobilization of the peasantry.

While Umbundu is his mother tongue, Savimbi learned to speak a number of other Angolan languages during the seven years he spent in the Angolan bush; he also speaks impeccable Portuguese, English and French. He manifests the rare ability to relate as comfortably with wealthy intellectuals as with humble peasants, a quality which has helped him win the support of perhaps as much as half the country, including from a good number of whites.

The absence of external patrons has enabled UNITA to eschew ideological questions and concentrate on pragmatic policies which could swell its ranks. The party has tried to steer a middle course between the MPLA and FNLA, using the rhetoric of "African socialism" but leaving little doubt that this would more closely resemble Kenya's than Tanzania's brand of African socialism. Until

late May Savimbi had adeptly managed to keep UNITA out of the MPLA/FNLA battles; in fact, UNITA's soldiers frequently joined the Portuguese troops in separating the fighting parties. This action has reinforced UNITA's image as a mediating force in the country which, combined with its leader's charisma, the importance of its Umbundu ethnic base, and its broad political platform, has catapulted the party from partial obscurity before the coup into the position of being perhaps the strongest political force in Angola.

UNITA's new and growing popularity has rekindled old MPLA antagonisms toward the party. Moreover, UNITA's peace keeping activities with the Portuguese forces have brought it into more frequent conflict with the MPLA, especially in those instances when the fighting has been initiated by the latter. These confrontations have reinforced the MPLA's belief that both the Portuguese and UNITA's armies are conspiring with the FNLA to eliminate it from the Angolan scene. Finally, the marked white support which UNITA has received has confirmed the MPLA's conviction that the former has always worked closely with reactionary Portuguese factions. The MPLA's increasingly hostile attitude toward UNITA was translated into action in late May and early June with its launching of heavy attacks on UNITA headquarters and other installations, resulting in the deaths of dozens of UNITA partisans. Not surprisingly, this has pushed UNITA closer to the FNLA in what almost appears to be an MPLA self-fulfilling prophecy. It can not yet be determined whether any lasting alliance is possible between the FNLA and UNITA since there are many important factors which militate against this prospect.

The Algarve agreement carefully tried to balance the distribution of power among the three nationalist parties and the Portuguese, but the transitional government has been immobilized by the intra- and interparty conflicts. This has produced a power and authority vacuum in which no party or personality is recognized as legitimate in all parts of the country or by all ethnic groups. Each of the parties has attempted to fill the vacuum in its zones

of control and influence by expanding the presence of its army. Moreover, the National Defense Commission (comprised of the Portuguese High Commissioner, three Portuguese officers, one representative from each party and the Presidential Council, the latter counting as one vote) has charged both the FNLA and MPLA with premeditated attempts to eliminate their rivals in their respective zones of influence. Today, the two forces are roughly separated by an imaginary line running between Luanda and Malange.

The Algarve agreement had called for the gradual creation of a national army to be made up of forces from the four signatory parties. Many hoped it would be strong enough to impose order on the country, if necessary, after independence in November. The feeble beginning of the national army was barely a month old, however, when in the March fighting the FNLA and MPLA contingents fled the integrated ranks to join their respective sides. Since that time the two parties have been reluctant to commit any more soldiers to the new army. Their reluctance to merge their forces with UNITA in a united army has shifted the burden of peace-keeping squarely onto the shoulders of the Portuguese army.

The Portuguese have avoided imposing order on Angola since that could easily embroil them in another war, especially now that the violence has reached such a high level. One of the AFM's initial and principal goals had been to bring the troops home before risking any more Portuguese lives in Africa. If Portuguese casualties mount and more troops are needed to restore the peace in Angola, some of the AFM's popular support at home could be jeopardized. Moreover, few Portuguese soldiers are willing to risk their lives trying to separate the three fighting armies, especially when each of the parties has strongly criticized the comportment of the Portuguese military. Roberto, in fact, has blamed Portuguese military and civilian sympathy for the MPLA as the cause of recent fighting. The increased peace-keeping chores are also a heavy burden on the already strained Portuguese economy. Finally, the AFM

has been meticulously careful not to incur any charges of paternalism, which a heavy-handed attempt to impose law and order would certainly invoke.

On the other hand, the AFM is committed to an orderly transition to independence in Angola and it is increasingly clear that unless Portugal enlarges its military forces and extends their activity, full fledged civil war could be imminent. The AFM also feels a strong responsibility toward the Portuguese who have remained in Angola thus far and whose situation has become extremely precarious. In addition, the recent massive white exodus could have disastrous economic consequences for both Angola and Portugal if it continues.

Since April 1974 whites in Angola have vacillated almost monthly in their decision to stay or leave. In the first few months following the coup, the majority of Angola's whites feared "another Congo." Reassured by General Spínola's reluctance to grant independence for "at least a generation," they gravitated toward the reactionary political policies he came to represent. Not surprisingly, Spínola's removal from office in the fall of 1974 caused many whites to flee Angola. Then, unexpectedly, a number of them began to return or cancelled their departure plans after the three nationalist parties welcomed the presence of those whites "who are capable of adapting themselves to majority rule."

The escalation of the interparty fratricide following the Al-gave accord dramatically reversed this trend. By early June Portuguese Information Minister Jorge Jesuino indicated that about 60,000 whites had already left Angola while half of those remaining had applied to return to Portugal. Within Angola many Portuguese are fleeing from towns in the interior to the capital as it becomes apparent that neither the transitional government nor the Portuguese military is capable of protecting their lives or property. Those in Luanda have not fared much better; hundreds of

Portuguese homes have been sacked and dozens have been killed in the fighting. The panic of the whites is no longer alleviated by the appeals of nationalist leaders to stay; for many the appeals no longer sound as sincere or reassuring. When asked for his reaction to the flight of whites in mid-May, Neto offered the following:

If an appeal is necessary from us that they should not leave our country, and if such an appeal from us will be heeded, then we would like to make it here--wholeheartedly calling on them to stay on in the county, with our assurances that we shall try our best to insure that their lives and property are protected and guaranteed.

Two weeks later a Portuguese official in Angola observed that the white population felt that the appeals "were not being translated into acts. On the contrary."

As each party consolidates its geographical sphere of control, the whites' identification with a particular party will increasingly correspond to their own regional location. Because past analyses of Angola have emphasized the racial dichotomy, the importance of white regional identification has been overlooked, yet it was extant long before the coup, especially in the central highlands. This trend is reminiscent of those British civil servants who stayed on in Nigeria following independence and whose strong loyalties to the northern, eastern, or western regions often matched those of Nigerians.

As though she were divinely chosen to be Africa's Job, Angola must face further tribulations as a result of the separatist movement in the oil rich enclave of Cabinda. Most of the approximately 80,000 Cabindans, the whites in the enclave, and the oil interests have rallied around rival factions of the Cabindan Liberation Front (FLEC) which are indirectly supported and encouraged by the governments of Zaire and Congo-Brazzaville (where each faction maintains its respective headquarters). Gabon also appears to be interested in Cabinda. The nearly \$450 million annual oil revenues

as well as a rich timber industry and fertile coffee lands make Cabinda a lucrative prize.

The fortunes of Cabindan secession vacillate but appear to improve in an inverse relation to the degree of Angola's governmental stability. The secession movement reached its apex during Spínola's presidency when FLEC was actually encouraged by the General who met with its representatives on several occasions. The AFM's ouster of Spínola and Rosa Coutinho's tightly run government were serious blows to Cabindan secession since the AFM stands solidly with the liberation movements in supporting Angola's territorial integrity. While only a handful of Angolans would benefit from Cabinda's secession, the interests of the governments of Zaire and Congo and possibly the United States and France, the multinational oil corporations (especially Gulf Oil), and the potential division among the Angolan parties over the enclave's future status all promise to make the final settlement of Cabindan secession troublesome unless a strong central power emerges in Luanda. In this sense the possibility of secession in Cabinda is not unlike the secession question in other parts of the country; the chances are heightened by inter-party fighting, political and economic disorder, and the absence of a national army with a monopoly over coercive force.

* * *

The fighting among the three liberation movements in Angola today involves more than a struggle to see who will assume the reins of power when independence becomes a reality in November. The fighting, especially between the MPLA and FNLA, has taken on the proportions of a jihad in which each side believes that the elimination of the other is requisite for peace and tranquility in the country. The FNLA views the MPLA as a tool of Russian and Portuguese "fascism" and "imperialism" while the latter is convinced that the FNLA is merely a front for Zairien and American

"fascism" and "imperialism." In other words, each party views the other as the devil incarnate, incapable of redemption, part of an international plot directed against itself, and purposefully accelerating the conflict in order to create a climate of chaos which could facilitate a seizure of power by force. At the same time, both the MPLA and FNLA see UNITA as a captive of the Portuguese settlers and therefore a barrier to the complete takeover of power by Africans.

The interparty battles are not confined to the respective armies. Each party has a number of ancillary branches (i.e., trade unions, youth organizations, medical corps, women's auxiliaries, etc.), all of which have come into conflict with their counterparts in the other parties. For example, while all three parties profess a strong commitment to "the workers," the attempt to manifest this support by a one-day nationwide strike (during a belated May Day celebration) failed when the FNLA and UNITA labor unions objected to the fact that the strike had been called unilaterally by the MPLA trade union.

There were occasions during the long year following the coup when the Armed Forces Movement was concerned about the possibility that a countercoup could be precipitated by the Portuguese in Angola. While an Angolan inspired countercoup no longer seems to be a threat, a massive influx into Portugal of Portuguese from Angola will present many difficult problems for the AFM. For example, if the white exodus from Angola continues at the present level (approximately 500 a day), the new arrivals could almost double the present rate of unemployment in Portugal, presently estimated to be between 8% and 10%. Furthermore, less than a quarter of the immigrants are skilled, which makes their economic reabsorption even more difficult. Finally, most of the returning Portuguese blame the AFM for their plight and represent a potentially dangerous source of opposition.

The AFM's commitment to expand its efforts to restore peace

in Angola is not shared by a majority of Portugal's citizenry who believe that enough lives and money have already been expended in Angola. Lt. Col. Correia, a member of the Portuguese Revolutionary Council and one of the most important AFM officials connected with Angola, recently argued that "the dynamics of the Portuguese revolution may be affected by events in Angola."

Finally, the prospects for international organizations such as the UN or OAU assisting in the restoration and maintenance of peace in Angola are not encouraging. Each of the three movements has expressed bitter resentment about the presence of international observers and each has vowed to resist the presence of international armed forces. Moreover, the OAU is deeply divided about Angola; conflicting loyalties of the member countries to the competing parties exacerbates the difficulty of achieving a common African position. While the UN has not become involved in the conflict, the same types of conflicting loyalties threaten to obviate any potential peace-keeping role it might play.

Since the three parties view the UN, the OAU, and the Portuguese Government with great suspicion, they may be forced to resolve the conflict themselves. Tragically, almost all of the previous attempts to resolve conflicts among the Angolan nationalists have broken down into armed warfare. The difficulty in convincing the three leaders to even agree to a summit meeting to discuss their differences does not leave much hope that Angola's problems will be resolved soon or peacefully.

STATEMENT by Professor Douglas L. Wheeler
June 16, 1975
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations'
Subcommittee on African Affairs

I would like to thank the Subcommittee for inviting me to testify before it on the subject of Angola.

In this presentation I shall make six major points. Briefly, and in summary, they are the following: one, the historical record in Angola, both remote and recent, suggests that there are deep roots to the current political fragmentation and conflict in that country and that, even under good conditions, political unity and stable government will be difficult to establish. Two, the Alvor Agreement, signed on January 15, 1975, between Portugal and the three major Angolan nationalist parties is, on paper, a masterful piece of diplomacy and compromise; its provisions should be studied and enforced. Three, the reasons why portions of this important agreement are not being honored lie in a fierce power struggle among the nationalist parties and in the way that the military provisions of the Agreement have worked in practice. Four, Angola is now experiencing aspects of a limited, ephemeral but bloody civil war which could spread further in Angola and could burgeon into an Angolan variant of the Spanish Civil War with grave international repercussions. Five, United States' policy in the remaining months before Angola's scheduled independence should strictly avoid any form of intervention in Angola's internal affairs and should support the

Portuguese Government's efforts to enforce the provisions of the Alvor Agreement. Six, I believe that what the Angolan people require now and in the near future is not military aid but massive economic and humanitarian aid, law and order, and the peace necessary to begin their age of independence in dignity and calm.

I shall now discuss each major point in order and at greater length. First, the historical dimensions of the current political fragmentation and conflict. Angola's political history has been largely tragic: centuries of slave-trade and wars, slavery, forced labor, and severe repression of the African opposition by the Portuguese. Adapting Conor Cruise O'Brien's memorable saying and applying to Angola's history it can be said that the study of Angola's history is like sitting on the cat-its surprises leave their scars! For both colonizers and the colonized in this massive territory there were many surprises in store. For centuries Africans were surprised that the Portuguese could surviveⁱⁿ/their coastal foothold and conquer an area of 480,000 square miles. In early 1961, when insurgency exploded in northern Angola, the Portuguese were surprised. When there was a military coup in Lisbon on April 25, 1974 Angolans of all races were surprised to see the dictatorship collapse and to see^{the}/ process of de-colonization begin.

Angolan nationalist has suffered from more than the narrow political environment of a 400 year old colony. The fragmentation of its nationalist parties has roots which lie in ethnic, racial, ideological, regional and even personalist differences.¹ In view of these truths, in Angola political unity and stable government will be, at best, difficult to establish.

²
Two. The Alvor Agreement, the treaty which set up the rules for the era of transition between colony and independent state, is, on paper, a masterpiece of carefully calculated diplomacy and compromise. It is the product of nearly eight months of tedious negotiations between Portugal and the Angolan nationalist parties, of pressures and aid from several major African leaders in Zambia and Kenya. The treaty attempts to strike a fair balance among the three Angolan nationalist parties recognized by Portugal as the only legitimate representatives of the Angolan peoples: MPLA, UNITA and FNLA.³ By promising a grant of independence on November 11, 1975 Portugal solved the problem of a timetable and limited the final de-colonization process to a little over nine months. The key structures of the Transition Government, which took power on January 31, 1975 are: an executive college of three "Presidents," each representing one of the three legal nationalist parties. This unusual college, together with a cabinet distributed equitably among the three parties and the Portuguese government will run daily affairs and administer the territory in the era

until independence. Three areas of responsibility, however, were delegated to other agencies: foreign affairs will be conducted by Portugal, and external and internal defense and security by a National Defense Committee, which has authority over all armed forces and the police. The National Defense Committee is composed of the High Commissioner, Portugal's chief representative, the College or Committee of Presidents and a Unified General Staff. The Chairman of this key organism is the High Commissioner. The missions of this Committee are: to carry out military policy, insure and safeguard the present frontiers of Angola, guarantee peace and security and public law and order, and to promote the safety of persons and property.

While this Alvor Agreement is a landmark in the history of Portugal, of Angola, and, indeed, in Africa, it has not worked as it should have and some of its provisions have not been enforced. Two basic problems have arisen: an authority problem and a security problem. The structure of the Presidential Committee or College does not provide for the exercise of power by one executive, like a Premier, or Prime Minister. With conflict among the Presidents, the Government thus lacks authority and centrifugal force. Armed conflict has led to a serious security problem.

Three. There has been a power struggle among the Angolan

2. For the full Text of the Alvor Agreement, see Appendix to this paper.

3. MPLA- Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola; UNITA- National Union for the Total Independence of Angola; FNLA- National Front for the Liberation of Angola.

4. For full provisions of the Treaty's Chapter IV, see Appendix

parties which has resulted in a heavy loss of life in the Luanda area and in rural areas northeast of that capital city. In the months since the Transition Government entered power there have been armed clashes among partisans of the nationalist parties in three bursts: late March/early April; April 28-May 3; and most, recently, early June. A conservative estimate of the dead is at least a thousand, the wounded several thousand. While there are no reliable exact casualty counts, it is clear that the hospitals of Luanda have become, reluctantly, the charnel houses of Central Africa. The National Defense Committee has been unable to fulfill its missions of peace, security and public law and order because of a number of inter-related factors: the irresponsible distribution of firearms to many persons not enrolled in the Portuguese Armed Forces or in the Mixed Forces, that is the future Army of Angola; this handing out of firearms was carried out by more than one nationalist party; the failure of the Angolan nationalist parties to cooperate among themselves; the lack of coordination between the nationalist leaders and the mass of their followers, some of whom have taken the law into their own hands. As a result many innocent civilians have been slaughtered.

The Portuguese High Commissioner, General Silva Cardoso, by most accounts, has been making a real effort to carry out the provisions of the Alvor Agreement. Although he has an armed force of some 24,000 Portuguese troops the Portuguese forces are subject to the pressures of fear, war-weariness,

indiscipline and insubordination. Still, according to accounts in the press, ⁵ this officer has shown himself to be a tireless and skilled arbiter. As a result of the armed clashes I mentioned above, agreements have been signed ordering the disarming of the population in the Luanda area, the removal of the nationalists' armed forces from the capital, and a general cease-fire. Just what effects these measures will have cannot be safely predicted.

Four. The ephemeral civil war of recent months- despite a number of ceasefires- has spread from the suburbs and African neighborhoods of Luanda into that city and beyond. There have been outbreaks in the districts to the north and east of the city and some disturbances in the district or enclave of Cabinda. If the power struggle in Angola gets out of control, if the structure set up by the Alvor Agreement disintegrates, it is possible that the conflict could spread and affect a wider area of Central Africa. With the known and potential petroleum, iron, copper, diamonds and manganese resources in Cabinda and Angola international groups, both public and private, may become involved. It is therefore important to realize the geographic, economic and strategic significance of Angola, what the present High Commissioner has referred to as "the enormous potentialities of this young State."⁶

5. See Approved For Release 2002/06/05 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300030007-2 (on), May 17, 1975.
6. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

Approved For Release 2002/06/05 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300030007-2

It is to be hoped that several possible disaster scenarios may be avoided. An Angolan variant of the Spanish Civil War might have grave international repercussions. Or, a spreading conflict in Angola could result in a war similar to that fought between the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Biafra, 1967-70; or, a variant of the Congo crisis of 1960-64, when a United Nations Force intervened. Some may suggest that the United Nations become involved in the de-colonization process in Angola. In my view, under present conditions, this would be a serious error. I believe that the best hope for a reasonably progressive and stable transition, in the remaining months, lies in full support for the Portuguese Government, the High Commissioner in Luanda, and the National Defense Committee, to carry out out the provisions of the Alvor Agreement with the interests of as many Angolans as possible in mind.

Five. In my personal opinion, American policy in the time before November 11, 1975 should concentrate on encouraging and backing the established machinery of the Agreement in order to maintain peace, law and order. By all means we should avoid any form of intervention in Angola's internal affairs. We should adhere to the spirit of the Security Council resolution of August 9, 1960 regarding the United Nations' Force in the Congo; namely, that we will not be a party to or in any way intervene in or be used to influence the outcome of any internal conflict, constitutional or otherwise."

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I believe that it would be in the interests of the peoples of Angola, ¹⁶⁵¹⁰ support the Portuguese Government, the High Commissioner and the established structures laid out by the Alvor Agreement. Most important we would attempt to support these elements in their effort to hold free elections for a Constituent Assembly by the end of October 1975. The problem now is not whether Angola will become independent. It is the manner in which this independence and the required political machinery are established. If there is a real effort to uphold the rule of agreed-upon laws, and the value of the ballotbox, the interests of the Angolan peoples will be well served. Point Six, my final point: not military aid, but massive economic and humanitarian aid are required for Angola as she begins a new era. The country has suffered the ravages of over thirteen years of war and recent civil strife. There has been an arms race among the nationalist groups, and the importation of arms by foreign powers, while the real needs of the people are quite different.

Angola requires fundamental improvements in education, commerce, agriculture, industry, mining and many other sectors. As I have suggested before, Angola's economy has great promise and potential. The development of large resources of petroleum and agriculture here could help alleviate food and fuel shortages in other parts of tropical Africa. I believe that our Government should be prepared to provide important economic and technical aid to an independent Angola.

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real needs of this hard-working and long-suffering people must be undertaken.

We can begin with educational aid. I know of a number of Universities whose faculties would be willing to help cooperate with Angolan institutions. I can speak only for a part of the University of New Hampshire, but I am certain that some faculty members in the College of Liberal Arts and in the College of Life Sciences and Agriculture would be eager to cooperate and help. A member of this Subcommittee, Senator Humphrey is already on record concerning educational aid to Angola. In a speech in the Senate and in a letter of August 27⁸ to Secretary of State Kissinger, Senator Humphrey advocated an expansion of educational aid to Angola, and to other Portuguese-speaking states, of two programs: The Southern African Student Program, under the Department of State, and The Southern African Training Program. I fully endorse this kind of aid and I would urge this Subcommittee to consider supporting more programs of this kind which could be of lasting importance to the future of Angola and her peoples.

There is an ancient saying about Africa that "Something new is always coming out of Africa." I would like to paraphrase this and say that "something important is always coming out of Angola." Americans, in general, know little about this huge and important country. The news media rarely gives it a line, unless there is a crisis and then only sporadically.

But I have a strong feeling that America will befriend the peoples of Angola and in the future will have closer relations in many areas. Some may wonder why the United States should care about what happens in Angola. But I suggest that there is in Angola a fund of economic, geographical and social elements ^{whose importance has not} ~~transcends~~ transcends such elements in a number of countries in Southeast Asia, where we have expended so much blood and treasure in the past two decades. Americans need to be reminded that there is also an historic link between Angola and the United States. A significant proportion of the ancestors of black Americans originated in Angola, once called the black mother of the New World. With Angola we have promises to keep ~~and~~ ~~to keep~~. But for now, let us keep one promise. Let us base our new diplomacy and aid programs not on a "balance of power" principle. Let us base it on the principle of human rights.

8. The text of Senator Humphrey's letter and Secretary of State Kissinger's reply is found in: Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, The Complex of United States-Portuguese Relations: Before and after the Coup (Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Africa...Ninety-Third Congress; Second Session (March 14, October 8, 9 and 22, 1974 (U.S. Govt Printing Office, 1974), pp. 239-240. For one view on American policy toward Southern Africa, see my article on that subject in The Christian Science Monitor (1974) and a piece in Issue. A Quarterly Journal of Africanist Opinion (IV, no. 2; Summer, 1974), pp. 4-8 with maps.

- APPENDIX -

ANGOLA
the
INDEPENDENCE
agreement

MINISTRY OF MASS COMMUNICATION

1975

The Portuguese State and the Angolan National Liberation Movements — the National Angolan Liberation Front (F. N. L. A.), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M. P. L. A) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U. N. I. T. A.) — having met at Alvor, in the Algarve, from 10 to 15 January 1975, to negotiate the procedure and the calendar of the access of Angola to independence, have agreed the following:

CHAPTER I

On the independence of Angola

Art. 1 — The Portuguese State recognizes the Liberation Movements — National Angolan Liberation Front (F. N. L. A.), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M. P. L. A.) and the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (U. N. I. T. A.) — as the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Angola.

Art. 2 — The Portuguese State solemnly restates its recognition of the right of the people of Angola to independence.

Art. 3—Angola forms one indivisible unit, within its present geographical and political boundaries, and in this context Cabinda is an unalienable component part of Angolan territory.

Art. 4—The independence and full sovereignty of Angola shall be solemnly proclaimed on 11 November 1975 in Angola by the President of the Portuguese Republic or by a specially appointed representative of the President.

Art. 5—Until independence is proclaimed, the power shall be wielded by the High Commissioner and by a Transitional Government, which shall take office on 31 January 1975.

Art. 6—The Portuguese State and the three Liberation Movements formally affirm, under this agreement, a general ceasefire, already being observed de facto by their armed forces throughout Angolan territory.

After this date, any use of force other than as decided by the rightful authorities to prevent internal acts of violence or acts of aggression from outside the country shall be considered to be illicit.

Art. 7—After the ceasefire the armed forces of the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. shall take up positions in the regions and places where they are at present stationed, until such time as the provisions laid down in Chapter IV of this Agreement shall be put into practice.

Art. 8—The Portuguese State undertakes to transfer progressively, no later than the term of the transitional period, all the powers it enjoys and wields in Angola to the Angolan organs of sovereignty.

Art. 9—With the conclusion of this Agreement, an amnesty is held to be granted to cover all the effects of the patriotic acts performed in the course of the national liberation struggle in Angola which would have been considered to be liable to punishment under legislation in force at the time of their performance.

Art. 10—The independent State of Angola shall exert its sovereignty fully and freely, both internally and on the international plane.

CHAPTER II

On the High Commissioner

Art. 11—During the transitional period the President of the Republic and the Portuguese Government shall be represented in Angola by the High Commissioner, who shall defend the interests of the Portuguese Republic.

Art. 12—The High Commissioner in Angola shall be appointed and released from office by the President of the Portuguese Republic, by whom he shall be sworn in and to whom he is politically responsible.

Art. 13—It is for the High Commissioner to:

- a) Represent the President of the Republic, ensuring and guaranteeing, in full agreement with the Transitional Government, the observance of the law;
- b) Safeguard and guarantee the physical security of Angolan territory, in close co-operation with the Transitional Government;
- c) Ensure the fulfilment of this Agreement and of such others as may come to be made between the Liberation Movements and the Portuguese State;
- d) Guarantee and promote the process of decolonization of Angola;
- e) Ratify all acts which concern, or refer to, the Portuguese State;
- f) Attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers, when he thinks fit, where he may participate in their discussions but without the right to vote;
- g) Sign, approve and have published the decree-laws and the decrees drafted by the Transitional Government;

h) Ensure, together with the Presidential Committee, the direction of the National Defence Committee, and to direct the foreign policy of Angola during the transitional period, aided in this by the Presidential Committee.

CHAPTER III

On the Transitional Government

Art. 14—The Transitional Government is chaired and directed by the Presidential Committee.

Art. 15—The Presidential Committee comprises three members, one from each liberation movement, and its main task is to direct and co-ordinate the Transitional Government.

Art. 16—Whenever it thinks fit, the Presidential Committee may consult the High Commissioner on matters concerning the work of the Government.

Art. 17—The decisions of the Transitional Government shall be taken by a majority of two-thirds; the members of the Presidential Committee shall chair it in turn.

Art. 18—The Transitional Government shall comprise the following Ministries: the Interior, Information, Labour and Social Security, Economic Affairs, Planning and Finance, Justice, Transports and Communications, Health and Social Affairs, Public Works, Housing and Town-Planning, Education and Culture, Agriculture, Natural Resources.

Art. 19—The following Offices of Secretaries of State are hereby instituted:

- a) Two in the Ministry of the Interior,
- b) Two in the Ministry of Information,
- c) Two in the Ministry of Labour and Social Security,

d) Three in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to be known respectively as the Secretary of State for Trade and Tourism, the Secretary of State for Industry and Power and the Secretary of State for Fisheries.

Art. 20—The Ministers of the Transitional Government shall be appointed in the same proportion by the National Angolan Liberation Front (F.N.L.A.), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A.), and by the President of the Republic and shall be sworn in by the High Commissioner.

Art. 21—Bearing in mind the transitional nature of the Government, the distribution of the Ministries shall be as follows:

- a) The President of the Portuguese Republic shall appoint the Ministers of Economic Affairs, of Public Works, Housing and Town-Planning and of Transports and Communications;
- b) The F.N.L.A. shall appoint the Ministers of the Interior, of Health and Social Affairs and of Agriculture;
- c) The M.P.L.A. shall appoint the Ministers of Information, of Planning and Finance and of Justice;
- d) The U.N.I.T.A. shall appoint the Ministers of Labour and Social Security, of Education and Culture and of Natural Resources.

Art. 22—The Offices of the Secretaries of State provided for in this Agreement shall be distributed as follows:

- a) The F.N.L.A. shall appoint one Secretary of State for Information, one Secretary of State for Labour and Social Security and the Secretary of State for Trade and Tourism;
- b) The M.P.L.A. shall appoint a Secretary of State for the Interior, a Secretary of State for Labour and Social Security and a Secretary of State for Industry and Power;

- c) The U.N.I.T.A. shall appoint a Secretary of State for the Interior, a Secretary of State for Information and the Secretary of State for Fisheries.

Art. 23 — The Transitional Government may institute further posts of Secretary and Under-Secretary of State, but in their distribution the rule of political heterogeneity shall be observed.

Art. 24 — It is for the Transitional Government to:

- a) Further, and co-operate in, the successful management of the process of decolonization until total independence is reached;
- b) Superintend the whole field of public Administration, ensuring its functioning and promoting access of Angolan citizens to posts and positions of responsibility;
- c) Conduct internal politics;
- d) Prepare and guarantee the holding of general elections for the Constituent Assembly of Angola;
- e) Perform through decree-laws the legislative function and draft decrees, regulatory decrees and instructions for the proper implementation of the laws;
- f) Guarantee, in co-operation with the High Commissioner, the safety of persons and property;
- g) Carry out the judicial reorganization of Angola;
- h) Define economic, financial and monetary policy and create the structures needed to ensure the rapid development of the economy of Angola;
- i) Guarantee and safeguard individual or collective rights and freedoms.

Art. 25 — The Presidential Committee and the Ministers are jointly responsible for the acts of the Government.

Art. 26 — The Transitional Government may not be dismissed on the initiative of the High Commissioner; any change in its composition shall be effected by agreement between the High Commissioner and the liberation movements.

Art. 27 — The High Commissioner and the Presidential Committee shall seek to solve all the difficulties arising from the work of the Government in a spirit of friendship and through reciprocal consultations.

CHAPTER IV

On the National Defence Committee

Art. 28 — A National Defence Committee is hereby set up, composed as follows:

The High Commissioner,
The Presidential Committee,
A Unified General Staff.

Art. 29 — The High Commissioner shall inform the National Defence Committee of all matters concerning national defence, both internally and abroad, so as to:

- a) Define and carry out the military policy arising from this Agreement;
- b) Ensure and safeguard the present frontiers of Angola;
- c) Guarantee peace and security and public law and order;
- d) Promote the safety of persons and property.

Art. 30 — The decisions of the National Defence Committee shall be taken by a simple majority; the High Commissioner, who will chair the Committee, shall have a vote.

Art. 31 — A unified General Staff is hereby set up, which shall comprise the commanders of the three branches of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Angola and three commanding officers of the liberation movements.

The unified General Staff shall be placed under the direct authority of the High Commissioner.

Art. 32 — Armed forces belonging to the three liberation movements shall be integrated to the same total number with the Portuguese forces in the mixed military forces, on the following numerical basis:

- 8 000 men belonging to the F.N.L.A.,
- 8 000 men belonging to the M.P.L.A.,
- 8 000 men belonging to the U.N.I.T.A.,
- 24 000 men belonging to the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Art. 33 — The National Defence Committee shall effect the progressive integration of the armed forces in the mixed military forces specified in the previous article; in principle the following calendar should be respected:

Between February and May, inclusive, and per month a total of 500 men from each of the liberation movements will be integrated and 1 500 men of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Between June and September, inclusive, and per month, a total of 1 500 men from each of the liberation movements will be integrated and 4 500 men of the Portuguese Armed Forces.

Art. 34 — Such Portuguese Armed Forces contingents as exceed the quotas laid down in art. 32 shall be evacuated from Angola by 30 April 1975.

Art. 35 — The evacuation of the contingent of the Portuguese Armed Forces integrated in the mixed military forces shall begin after 1 October 1975 and shall be completed by 29 February 1976.

Art. 36 — The National Defence Committee shall organize mixed police forces to maintain public law and order.

Art. 37 — The unified police command shall have three members, one from each of the liberation movements, and leadership shall be put in commission, the chair being taken by each member in turn. The force shall be placed under the authority and supervision of the National Defence Committee.

CHAPTER V

On refugees and displaced persons

Art. 38 — Immediately after the swearing-in of the Transitional Government, mixed equal-representation committees shall be set up, on nominations by the High Commissioner and by the Transitional Government, to plan and prepare the structures, means and procedure necessary to deal with Angolan refugees.

The work of these committees will be supervised by the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs.

Art. 39 — Those persons housed in the «Peace Villages» may return to their own villages and homes.

The mixed equal-representation committees shall propose to the High Commissioner and to the Transitional Government social, economic and other measures to ensure a speedy return to normal ways of life of displaced persons and the reintegration of their various forms of activity in the economic life of the country.

CHAPTER VI

On general elections for the Constituent Assembly of Angola

Art. 40 — The Transitional Government shall organize general elections for a Constituent Assembly within not more than 9 months from the date of its installation, that is, 31 January 1975.

Art. 41 — Candidatures to the Constituent Assembly shall be put forward exclusively by the liberation movements — F.N.L.A., M.P.L.A. and U.N.I.T.A. — as the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Angola.

Art. 42 — Once the Transitional Government is installed, a Central Committee shall be instituted, with equal representation of the liberation movements, to draft the Basic Law and to prepare the elections to the Constituent Assembly.

Art. 43 — When the Basic Law has been approved by the Presidential Committee, the Central Committee shall:

- a) Draft the Electoral Law;
- b) Organize lists of voters;
- c) Register the lists of candidates for election to the Constituent Assembly put forward by the liberation movements.

Art. 44 — The Basic Law shall remain in force until the Constitution of Angola comes into force, but it may not run counter to the terms of this Agreement.

CHAPTER VII

On Angolan nationality

Art. 45 — The Portuguese State and the three liberation movements — F.N.L.A., M.P.L.A. and U.N.I.T.A. — undertake to co-operate to eliminate all the consequences of colonialism. On this topic, the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. stress their policy of non-discrimination, according to which the quality of Angolan citizenship is definable by birth in Angola or by domicile therein, always provided that those domiciled in Angola identify themselves with the aspirations of the Angolan Nation through a conscious choice.

Art. 46 — The F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. hereby undertake to consider as Angolan citizens all individuals born in Angola, provided that they do not declare, on the terms and within the time-limits to be laid down, that they wish to maintain their present nationality or to choose another one.

Art. 47 — Individuals not born in Angola but settled there may seek Angolan nationality in accordance with such rules governing Angolan nationality as come to be laid down in the Basic Law.

Art. 48 — A mixed committee with equal representation will study special agreements to regulate the forms of concession of Angolan citizenship to Portuguese citizens domiciled in Angola, and the status of Portuguese citizens resident in Angola and of Angolan citizens resident in Portugal.

CHAPTER VIII

On economic and financial topics

Art. 49 — The Portuguese State undertakes to regularize with the State of Angola the situation arising from the existence of property belonging to the latter outside Angolan territory, so as to facilitate the transfer of such property, or the equivalent value, to the territory and ownership of Angola.

Art. 50 — The F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. declare themselves ready to accept the responsibility arising from the financial undertakings assumed by the Portuguese State on behalf of, and relating to, Angola, always provided that they have been assumed in the real interest of the people of Angola.

Art. 51 — A special mixed equal-representation committee, composed of experts appointed by the Provisional Government of the Portuguese Republic and by the Transitional Government of the State of Angola, shall list the property mentioned in art. 49 and the credits referred to in art. 50, shall effect such acts of valuation as it thinks fit and shall put before the two Governments such solutions as it holds to be just.

Art. 52 — The Portuguese State undertakes to provide the Committee specified in the previous article with all the information and data at its disposition and which the Committee may need in order to reach well-thought-out conclusions and to propose equitable solutions within the principles of truth, respect for the legitimate rights of each party and the most loyal co-operation.

Art. 53 — The Portuguese State will aid the State of Angola in setting up a Central Issue Bank. The Portuguese State undertakes to transfer to the State of Angola the powers, the assets and the debits of the Angolan Department of the Bank of Angola, on conditions to be agreed in the mixed committee for financial topics. This committee will also consider all questions related to the Portugal Department of the same bank, proposing just solutions to the extent that they concern and affect Angola.

Art. 54 — The F. N. L. A., the M. P. L. A. and the U. N. I. T. A. undertake to respect the property and the legitimate interests of the Portuguese citizens domiciled in Angola.

CHAPTER IX

On co-operation between Angola and Portugal

Art. 55 — The Portuguese Government on the one hand, and the liberation movements on the other, agree to set up between Portugal and Angola, links of constructive, lasting co-operation in all fields, specifically in the cultural, technical, scientific, economic, commercial, monetary, financial and military spheres, on the basis of independence, equality, freedom, mutual respect and reciprocity of interests.

CHAPTER X

On Mixed Committees

Art. 56 — Technical mixed equal-representation committees will be set up by the High Commissioner, in agreement with the Presidential Committee, to research and propose solutions for

problems arising from decolonization and to lay down the foundations of active co-operation between Portugal and Angola, especially in the following spheres:

- a) Cultural, technical and scientific;
- b) Economic and commercial;
- c) Monetary and financial;
- d) Military;
- e) The acquisition of Angolan nationality by Portuguese citizens.

Art. 57 — The committees mentioned in the previous article shall carry out their work and negotiations in a climate of constructive co-operation and loyal spirit of compromise. Their conclusions shall be put as quickly as possible before the High Commissioner and the Presidential Committee for their consideration and for the drafting of agreements between Portugal and Angola.

CHAPTER XI

General provisions

Art. 58 — Any questions arising as to the interpretation and application of this Agreement which cannot be solved on the terms of art. 27 above shall be settled by negotiation between the Portuguese Government and the liberation movements.

Art. 59 — The Portuguese State, the F. N. L. A., the M. P. L. A. and the U. N. I. T. A., true to the social and political ideals repeatedly stated by their leaders, reaffirm their respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and also actively repudiate all forms of social discrimination, especially apartheid.

Art. 60 — The present Agreement shall come into force immediately after it has been approved by the President of the Portuguese Republic.

The delegations of the Portuguese Government, the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. stress the climate of perfect co-operation and cordiality in which the negotiations took place and feel great satisfaction at reaching this Agreement, which will meet the just aspirations of the Angolan people and of which the Portuguese people are rightly proud; henceforth they will be linked by ties of profound friendship and common desire for constructive co-operation for the progress of Angola, of Portugal, of Africa and of the world as a whole.

Signed at Alvor, Algarve, on 15 January 1975, in four copies in Portuguese.

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Statement Prepared for the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 16, 1975

John A. Marcum, Provost, Merrill College, University of California Santa Cruz, and President, African Studies Association

After a fifteen year colonial struggle, Angolan nationalists are on the verge of realizing or destroying an independent Angolan state. With the collapse and exit of the old colonial regime, three rival liberation movements have been left to compete for political ascendancy. It may be useful therefore to focus briefly on (1) the genesis and character of this political tripolarity, on (2) the tendency for it to encourage extensive external intervention and on (3) some thoughts concerning what, under the circumstances, might constitute an appropriate American response.

I.

Angola's nationalist movements are products of and responses to the extreme conditions of what might be termed Portugal's integral colonialism. After the Second World War, while Britain, France and Belgium were reluctantly permitting Africans under their rule to organize and gain increasing measures of political power, Portugal still blocked even the organized expression of African cultural life. The government of the late strongman, Premier António Salazar, ruthlessly rooted out and destroyed groups and individuals suspected of nationalist activity and sympathies.

Underground political groups were decimated by the police. Few survived. Those that did were deeply impacted by the anxieties and distrust of clandestine politics. And they were unable to extend their

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organizing beyond constrictive regional limits, were unable to build a cohesive nationalist movement extending to a pan-Angolan structure and vision.

As nationalist leaders or would-be leaders from the thin ranks of Angola's tiny educated elite (one to five percent African literacy) sought refuge abroad, they reaggregated along regional and ethno-linguistic lines. The insecurities and frustrations of exile tended to reinforce parochial loyalties among them. And colonial authorities, infiltrators and money manipulated divisive political ambitions within them.

Angolan nationalists did manage to organize among other refugees, émigrés and laborers in neighboring African territories. From exile they helped to trigger and then sustained more than a decade of small scale anticolonial insurgency inside Angola. During those years, however, they were never able to fully transcend their constricted origins and harsh conditioning. They clustered within three major movements, each of which was anchored in a different one of Angola's three major ethno-linguistic regions. And over time, each movement developed its own military force and sources of external support. As each movement sought military and political advantage in the conflict with Portugal it collided with its competitors. The result was a complex three-way struggle for revolutionary primacy interspersed with fratricidal clashes and suffused with a profound and bitter political rivalry.

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When the government of Salazar's successor, Marcello Caetano, fell to the anticolonialist Armed Forces Movement in 1974, no Angolan group had yet achieved the sort of clearcut preeminence that FRELIMO insurgents had won in Portugal's other large colony, Mozambique. Under pressure from Portugal's new military government and African states, Angolan nationalists did agree to form a tripartite coalition government pending general elections in Autumn 1975. But the goal of merging three separate armies and melding three separate parties into new national structures promised to be elusive.

Twice the size of Texas, Angola possesses subsoil (oil, iron, diamonds) and agriculture wealth on a scale that suggests great economic potential for a unified state. But will Angola emerge as a unified state? By scheduling October elections in advance of November independence, Lisbon placed a premium on political process, on coalition building and trans-ethnic alliances. By creating the need to reach out, mobilize popular electoral support and organize on a national scale, Lisbon encouraged the construction of a single polity. And by placing each Angolan government ministry under a tripartite team of nationalists, Lisbon provided representatives of the three movements with an opportunity to gain positive intergroup experience and to work, compromise and, hopefully, coalesce across party lines. As they transformed themselves from exile/guerrilla movements into legal political parties, moreover, the movements brought into their ranks new leadership unscarred by the long years of exile and fratricidal competition. Older leaders who were locked into the quarrels and grudges of the exile years would be replaced in due

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course by a new, internally generated leadership. But would this new leadership itself emerge from a peaceful process of national consolidation or as the result of civil war and/or partition? The answer, it seemed, would depend in part upon external forces.

II.

As Lisbon withdraws its war weary forces -- and not to do so could provoke mutiny -- Lisbon's capacity to umpire the zero sum gaming of Angola's contending movements must decline. Contrarily, the influence of neighboring African states, notably Zaire, must increase. Since 1960 successive Zaire (Congo) governments under Patrice Lumumba, Cyrille Adoula and Mobutu Sese Soko have supported the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA) which draws its principal backing from among the 600,000 to 700,000 Bakongo people of northern Angola. Under the leadership of Holden Roberto, an Angolan émigré and Mobutu's brother in law, the FNLA has become an extension or branch of Zairian politics. When Mobutu turned to Peking in 1973, Roberto followed just behind and ended up with a Chinese military mission training his largely Bakongo army at bases in Zaire. The exclusive recipient of Zairian backing, Roberto's FNLA was able to recruit and arm a military force of between 15,000 and 21,000 which now controls much of Angola's northern coffee country and possibly petroleum-rich coast. It appears unlikely that Mobutu would willingly let the Bakongo north border areas such as the diamond center of Dundo, or the Benguela railroad which links mineral rich Shaba (Katanga) to the Atlantic, fall into what he considered unfriendly hands.

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Indeed, ~~reports that dissident guerrilla forces are still or once again~~ **Approved For Release 2002/06/05 : CIA-RDP77M00144R000300030007-2** active in Eastern Zaire, give reason to speculate that the government in Kinshasa will continue to relate to much or all of Angola as properly a Zairian "sphere of influence." In the view of the former Angolan High Commissioner and left-wing critic of Mobutu, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, a "progressive" regime in Angola would constitute a "terrifying prospect" for President Mobutu. Consequently, Coutinho believes the Zaire Government is attempting by all means to prevent the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from coming to power in Angola. According to him, a "progressive" Angola under MPLA rule would quickly "spell the end of Mobutu."

Mobutu's commitment to the FNLA has not prevented him from also extending backing to secessionists who would detach the oil rich enclave of Cabinda from Angola. Like a Danzig astride the tip of Zaire's "Polish corridor" to the sea, Cabinda, whether to be annexed or satellized, is certainly a prime target for Zairian political-economic control.

Just how far Mobutu would be willing to extend his prestige and purse in quest of Cabinda or in support of the FNLA is unclear. But he is in a position to intervene through the FNLA so as to at least minimize chances for the rival MPLA to assume power outside the Luanda region, election or no election.

The MPLA, centered among 1.3 Mbundu and mestiços in Luanda and its hinterland, benefits from the support of both the Portuguese Left and the Soviet Union. Intercession by Lisbon's new leftwing government in

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effect blocked maneuvers from Kinshasa to eliminate the MPLA by urging the recognition of dissident elements who had challenged the legitimacy of MPLA leadership under the Marxist poet and physician, Dr. Agostinho Neto. And Soviet arms shipments have given it a capacity to slug it out with FNLA military units in Luanda and elsewhere -- at a cost of untold hundreds of lives.

The third movement, The National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), has received less external support than its two rivals. With leadership from and roots in the Central and Southern regions of Angola among the two million Ovimbundu and smaller ethnic groups of those areas, UNITA has relied more upon political than military action. And during the last years of the war, its Ovimbundu leader, Jonas Savimbi, lived and led a small guerrilla force inside Eastern Angola -- not from exile. Since 1974 his political acumen and charisma have enabled him to build alliances and support among diverse groups, including resident Portuguese. And he has won diplomatic backing from President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. A long time ally of the South ^{West} East Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), UNITA has continued to enjoy a cooperative association with Namibia's principal nationalist organization. But contrary to some speculation it does not favor the cession of Ovambo (or Kwanyama speaking) areas of Southern Angola to Ovamboland (Namibia). And the government of South Africa has little or no reason for favoring or fearing it over one of the other two movements.

External support, especially arms, for the FNLA and MPLA is fueling

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the flames of incipient civil war. The result could well be a four way partition: Cabinda under local secessionists (FLEC); the Bakongo north under the FNLA; the Luanda-Mbundu region under the MPLA; and the vast (two thirds of the country) Central/Southern regions under UNITA. Efforts by Lisbon and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to persuade the Angolans to hold together in coalition and build a unified state under their transitional government represent a countervailing influence. Civil war or partition could only be destructive of Portuguese economic interests in Angola and disruptive of African diplomatic and political efforts to advance the political cause of Black Africans in white ruled Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. But what are American interests in all this?

III.

According to Denis Herbstein writing in The Sunday Times (London, May 18, 1975), the United States has intervened in the Angolan imbroglio. "Today Roberto," he alleges, "receives support from the United States." Other accounts would have the U.S. covertly supporting Zaire's efforts to eliminate the MPLA or have the Gulf Oil Company selfservingly engaged in conducting its own foreign policy in support of Cabinda secessionists.

What is the basis for such speculation? Others are better placed to answer this question. But it is encouraged in part by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when he professes to be gloomy about the spread of "Marxist ideologies and perceptions of the world which are contrary to our values" and proceeds to read dangers and threats into foreign situations that for

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us should be of little or no concern. Indeed, perhaps the most important thing the American government can do in Angola is to refrain from projecting parochial or ideological intolerance into its perception of the situation there. Washington should, above all, avoid the trap of overreacting to hostile rhetoric and socialist advocacy and of identifying potential "enemies." Necessarily, all Angolan liberation movements resent American aid to Portugal during the years of insurgency. And if one, the MPLA, is particularly distrustful of American economic and political motives and itself the beneficiary of substantial aid from the Soviet Union and other Communist sources, even it presents no real threat, no cause for alarm. The United States should find it just as possible to have mutually advantageous economic relations with a Marxist regime in Angola as with a European state such as Yugoslavia. Flexibility and caution coupled with a cultivated bent for trap aversion should protect us from getting caught up in an internal conflict in which we have no vital interest.

That said, the United States can and should seize the opportunity to exert its diplomatic influence on behalf of a political as over against a military solution to Angola's political crisis. In doing so, it should limit itself to modest and constructive support of efforts by Lisbon and the Organization for African Unity to further the cause of a unified state. It should set a big power example and desist from any overt or covert intervention thus putting it in a credible position to discourage such intervention on the part of others, except for possible peacekeeping action by the OAU. American economic, technical or educational assistance

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should be provided but through multilateral (UN, OAU, ECA) efforts and Washington should be enthusiastically supportive of Portuguese-African cooperation based upon mutuality of interest.

Mutuality of interest should, in fact, be the guiding principle behind all our future relations with Angola (as well as other African states). Even American strategic interests can thereby be best served. A relationship based upon equitable commerce and reciprocal trust would be the most likely to see an accommodation of any legitimate future need for American naval or aircraft to use Angolan facilities. Contrarily the case of Thailand shows how quickly action that violates this principle of mutuality of interest can render useless expensive bases and formal alliances.

During the months immediately ahead, the United States should unobtrusively but wholeheartedly encourage efforts by Lisbon or the OAU to promote Angolan unity and discourage civil war. It should also be openly and convincingly prepared to establish respectful relations with those who end up governing Angola, whoever they may be.

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